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ON TONIGHT'S MENU: TOASTED CORNBREAD
WITH FIREFLY GENES?1 ADAPTING FOOD
LABELING LAW TO CONSUMER PROTECTION
NEEDS IN THE BIOTECH CENTURY
We face a new situation in history. Ingenuity, striking hands with
cunning trickery, compounds a substance to counterfeit an article
of food. It is made to look like something it is not; to taste and
smell like something it is not; to sell like something it is not, and
so deceive the purchaser.2

Robert M. LaFollette
I. INTRODUCTION

Although it seems an exclusively contemporary concern, the effect
of manufacturing processes on the food supply began a fierce debate
over food quality and safety well over a century ago. This "pure food"
movement generated harsh opposition to "false" foods such as glucose
and oleomargarine, to the deceptive sale of oils and animal fats
disguised as butter, and to the sale of cartons of milk and other
foodstuffs whose contents were frequently substandard or rancid. The
unsanitary and often revolting conditions of food handling, storage, and
distribution at the turn of the century evinced a need for legal standards
in regulating food quality and preventing "adulteration... of food and
drink." 4 These goals, aimed at ensuring consumer safety and informed

1. In a complaint filed last year against the FDA, consumer plaintiffs created a menu of
currently marketed bio-engineered foods that are not being labeled as such. Alliance For
Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, No. 98-1300 (D. D.C. filed May 27, 1998); see also Jeffrey Kluger,
Food FighL"The Battle Heats Up Between the U.S. and Europe Over Genetically Engineered
Crops, TIME, September 13,1999.
2. JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, PURE FOOD 66 (1989) (quoting Cong. Rec., 49 Cong. I ses.,
1886).
3. Food quality has always been subject to legal regulation. For example, from 1266 the
Assize of Bread was involved in pricing and marketing of bread in England, setting standards
for different varieties of product and levels of quality. For an overview, see Peter Barton
Hutt, A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Food, 39
FOOD DRUG & COSM. L.J. 2, 15, n. 108 (1984). In colonial Virginia, a significant problem
with adulteration of wine led to legally imposed penalties. See id at 37.
4. Frederick H. Degnan, The Regulation of Food Safety, in 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW
AND REGULATION 162 (Robert P. Brady et al. eds., 1997).
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purchasing, culminated in the Food and Drugs Act of 1906.! The Act's
provisions were broadly defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, which

made it a useful tool for addressing the widespread problem of food

adulteration.6 This success led to the passage of several subsequent food
quality measures by Congress,' including the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act of 1938 (the "FDCA"),which serves as the cornerstone for food

labeling requirements!
The primary emphasis of the FDCA is to penalize deceptive
marketing practices and compel disclosure of pertinent information
regarding food purchases. Through the FDCA, the government is
vested with the power to take action against foods rendered unfit by
filth, microbiological contamination, and other forms of spoilage.9
Additionally, "adulteration and misbranding""0 of food carries penalties
including criminal prosecution and seizure or condemnation of the
offending food product."
Despite the pervasiveness of their efforts, turn of the century
lawmakers could not create legislation encompassing the dramatic
changes in food production and distribution that are occurring in
modern food markets because of biotechnology. The ability to make
informed food purchases involving complex processes continue to be a

5. Pub. L. No. 59-384 § 7, 34 U.S. Stat. 768, 769 (1996). In fact, "... the battle of butter
versus oleomargarine engrossed House members through nine straight days of debate, the
first major consideration given by either House of Congress to a pure-food issue." See
YOUNG, supra note 2, at 76.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.S. 399 (1914)
(defining when an added ingredient renders food "injurious to health"); United States v. Coca
Cola Co. of Atlanta, 241 U.S. 265, 284 (1916) (defining broadly the scope of "added
ingredient").
7. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 406, 21 U.S.C. 346 (1938) (establishing per se
rule against all unnecessary and avoidable poisonous and deleterious substances added to
food); Pesticide Residues Amendment, 21 U.S.C. 364(a) (1954) (adding § 408 to regulate
pesticide tolerance levels); Food Additives Amendment, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321s, 348 (1958)
(defining "food additives" and providing for premarket approval except for GRAS); Color
Additives Amendment, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(t), 379e (1958) (subjecting all colorants to
premarket regulation); Saccharine Study and Labeling Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(z), 343(o) (1977)
(moratorium on FDA ban of saccharine; requiring labeling of products); Dietary Supplement
Health and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (1994) (excluding dietary
supplements from definition of "food additive"); Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 108 Stat. 4325 (1994) (requiring standard-format nutrition
labeling).
8. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 406,21 U.S.C. 346 (1938).
9. See Degnan, supra note 4, at 162.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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primary concern despite modern production techniques. The variable
factor in the modern age, however, is that the identification of "pure"
butter, milk, fruits, and vegetables is no longer as clear as it was to the
original "pure food" proponents. Additives, preservatives, novel
ingredients, and biotechnology have blurred the pure food definition, a
complication that will fuel debate as biotechnology takes a greater role
in the food supply.
As the "biotech century" comes in,12 consumers have already seen
their local farmer, milk peddler, and butcher replaced by multinational
producers and corporate-controlled agribusinesses.13 Over the past
several years, these producers have brought whole and processed foods
with manipulated genetic characteristics to consumers' tables. Few of
these foods are labeled. Many of them have had little or no safety
testing. Because of the novelty of biotechnology and the lack of
regulation, many feel that these genetically-modified ("GM") foods
present unacceptable risks to the consumer. This perspective is
accompanied by calls for a complete ban on GM production, stricter
testing for GM foods, or, at the very least, labeling of foods derived
from GM crops so that consumers will be aware of what they are
purchasing. 4 However, current law is largely unresponsive to these
calls. Little is done to address the concern over conflicting scientific
findings and enable meaningful safety assessment of GM crops.
Moreover, this lack of guidance can ultimately thwart independent
initiatives to label GM foods.
The lack of a federal labeling scheme for GM foods creates d
disjointed, ad hoc approach to their regulation, as legislatures, agencies,
and courts struggle to address the complex issues that genetic
engineering raises. Indeed, the lack of GM labeling requirements
erodes the consumer protection mission of the FDCA by ignoring the
question of how accepted food safety standards will evolve as
biotechnology enters the marketplace. Additionally, the lack of federal
guidance permits a mounting litigious battle in what can amount to little
more than a propaganda war between GM corporations and their
"organic" counterparts. A regulatory structure that monitors and labels
GM foods will enable risk assessment, encourage the best use of this
12. JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY:

HARNESSING

THE GENE AND

REMAKING THE WORLD (1998).
13. Major corporate agribusinesses include Novartis, Monsanto, Ceiba-Gigny, American
Cynamid, and Upjohn. See id.
14. Frederick H. Degnan, The Food Label and the Right to Know, 52 FOOD & DRUG

LJ. 49 (1997).
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new and powerful technology, and ease the current consumer hostility
to genetic engineering that threatens to obscure its potential benefits. 5
This Comment argues that a federal labeling scheme for geneticallyengineered food is necessary and consistent with the rationale for
previous federal food safety measures. Part Two provides an overview
of the agricultural applications of biotechnology and describes the
genesis of the biotech and organic food markets. Part Three describes
the disjointed manner in which courts have responded to biotechnology
issues because of the lack of federal guidance. This Part first argues that
GM labeling falls within the definition of a substantial state interest.
Second, labeling GM foods is a disclosure requirement, and as such
should be held to a less strict review under the commercial speech
doctrine, which so far has derailed the imposition of mandated labels.
Part Four describes the lack of a comprehensive response by regulatory
agencies and Congress, which forces ad hoc judgments and safety
assessments that erode consumer protection in contravention of
established food safety law. Part Five suggests that as a basis for a food
labeling program, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") should
be given explicit authority for testing GM products by adopting a
process-based regulatory approach. This approach is best achieved
through enlarging the terms "food additive," "materially altered," and
"misleading" as defined in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. This Part
also offers suggestions for a more unified approach to GM crop
production oversight. In addition to a federal labeling scheme,
voluntary labeling efforts for non-GM foods should be encouraged, and
the disjointed food supervisory duties of the Food and Drug
Administration, Department of Agriculture, and Environmental
Protection Agency might best be replaced by one food quality agency. 6
This Comment concludes that accommodating the legitimate safety
concerns surrounding biotechnology will promote the most effective use
15. Biotechnology is making an impact in medicine as well. Gene therapy techniques
replace genes that are missing or are not functioning correctly with the correct gene. The first
successful gene therapy was used in 1990 to treat an immune system defect in children called
ADA. Gene therapy trials are currently underway to treat diseases such as brain tumors,
cystic fibrosis, and HIV. See generallyJudith E. Beach, No "Killer Tomatoes": Easing Federal
Regulation of GeneticallyEngineered Plants, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 181 (1998).
16. One element of this argument is that labeling laws are better focused on protecting
consumers from deception not by imposing definitions on "organic," but by recognizing risks
posed to the food supply by requiring the labeling of bio-engineered foods. Using regulatory
power to clarify the term "organic" has proven to be inefficient and of dubious value to
consumers. See Kenneth C. Amaditz, The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 and its
Impending Regulations:A Big Zero for OrganicFood?, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 537 (1997).
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of the technology.
Underscoring the argument made in this Comment is that the legal
legitimacy of GM foods cannot depend on technological expertise alone.
Regulatory actions with regard to biotechnology must be based on a
reasoned risk assessment that satisfies public protection concerns and
not solely narrow commercial interests."
II. THE EMERGENCE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN AGRICULTURE

This Part describes the process of genetic engineering, the
controversy surrounding its appearance in food products, and the
consumer opposition that impedes its acceptance in the market. It
shows that regulation of GM foods through labeling will prevent the
perpetuation of the environmental and economic risks that fuel
consumer distrust of the GM industry.
Although the use of biological organisms in food is in itself not a
new development,' 8 the use of DNA in a commercial context is a
relatively recent occurrence. Genetic engineering refers to the process
of transferring DNA from one organism to another." Genetic traits that
code in naturally produced proteins are located, removed, isolated, and
spliced into the genetic material of a different organism. This induces
the host to produce the desired trait, and the new genes may be grown
in commercial quantities. Because genetic change to the individual
organism is immediate, genetic engineering is less time-consuming than
the traditional method of cross-breeding species for producing desired
traits. A2°plant or animal that is modified in this way is called
transgenic.
The prevailing opinion is that the social and commercial effects of
transgenic species will be more far-reaching than anything seen in the
industrial revolution or the computer age. Genes, it seems, "are the raw

17. SHEILA JANSANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN

AMERICA 153-54 (1995).
18. Adding bacteria to convert milk to yogurt is a common example.
19. Also known as recombinant DNA technology, it allows direct injection or immersion
of genetic material into the DNA of another organism; such as splicing a gene from a silk
moth into the DNA of a potato in order to increase resistance to disease. See Dan L. Burk,
The Milk Free Zone: Federaland Local Interests in RegulatingRecombinant BST, 22 COLUM.
J. ENVTL L. 227,231 (1997).
20. Although this Comment focuses on GM applications to food products, controversy
also surrounds the application of the technology to humans and animals. See generally
RIFKIN, supra note 12.
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resource of the new economic epoch."'M Although biotechnology
appears to be an awesome new science with limitless possibilities, a
major controversy is the propriety of using genetic material as an
economic commodity. Observers criticize the practice of searching the
planet for species of microbes, plants, animals, and humans with rare
genetic traits that may have market potential in another organism.
Perhaps the most controversial practice, however, is that after modifying
a gene, companies seek patent protection for their new "invention."2
Criticisms of commercial biotechnology come from a variety of
moral, religious, and economic philosophies. Foreboding predictions of
an already shrinking gene pool becoming a source of monetary value
abound.

But whether we can turn the clock back and avoid the

manipulation of DNA seems to be a moot question. The choice is no
longer whether we should use biotech, but what kinds of biotech
applications we will choose.'
Mysteriously, the great public concern over food derived from GM
crops is often dismissed and even ignored.' By defining the controversy
as a "socioscientific dispute, "' proponents of GM dismiss consumer
opposition as "ultimately [a question of] policy, not questions of
science." 26 The rationale is that since genetic engineering is "complex
enough to elude the understanding of the average citizen," the

controversy must therefore be centered around "societal preference. "2
Yet the well-documented studies show that the safety of genetic

engineering is not completely understood.2

Moreover, consumers in

21. Jeremy Rifkin, Genetic Blueprints Aren't Mere Utilities, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 1998, at
B7. Biotech is being used in a variety of fields: animal husbandry, energy, construction
materials, pharmaceuticals, and foods. See id.
22. See id. The patent issue will likely become a controversial question in biotech. "It is
expected that in less than eight years, nearly all of the sixty thousand or so genes that make
up the genetic blueprints of the human race will have been identified and become the
intellectual property of trans-national life science companies." Id.
23. See id.
24. Recent polls show eighty to ninety percent of consumers in the U.S. and Europe
demand labeling of GM foods, primarily so that they can avoid buying them. Fully ninetythree percent of Americans feel that GE foods should be labeled, and fifty-four percent
wanted to see agriculture move toward organic production methods. See Campaign for Food
Safety press release, FOOD BYTES #13, "News and Analysis on Genetic Engineering &
Factory Farming," (Oct. 31, 1998) (on file with the author).
25. See Burk, supra note 19, at 229 (quoting MILTON R. WESSEL, SCIENCE AND
CONSCIENCE 4-5

(1980)).

26. Id. at 229.
27. Id.
2& See, e.g., Mikkelsen, T.R., The Risk of Crop Transgene Spread, 380

NATURE

31
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general are well-informed about the risks. Yet neither the GM industry
nor regulators offer any information to assuage these legitimate
concerns. The negative consumer reaction has led GM companies to
oppose GM information being given to consumers, even at the cost of
litigation."
A. Balancing Biotech Benefits and Risks

Despite the variety of perceived risks in GM foods, the general
observation is that "[b]iotechnology appears to be leading the race as
the primary tool of agriculture for the twenty-first century." 30 Most
agricultural biotech research has created improved crop strains that are
herbicide-tolerant and virus-resistant. However, the great benefits of
these crops also pose serious potential risks to economy, biodiversity,
and human health,
1. Economic Risks
GM advocates often describe voluntary GM labeling initiatives as
being "suspiciously concentrated in small-farm.., states. 3 1 Yet there is
evidence that many GM production methods have catastrophic ripple
effects on small farms. First, family farms that cannot afford large-scale
production often see their prices forced down by the prolific output of
farms that use GM methods, which can afford greater economies of
scale and lower labor costs. An example of this effect can be seen in the
use of the bovine growth hormone BGH.32
Second, GM companies exert vigorous economic control over a
farmer's planting. For example, the Monsanto corporation has received
criticism for prosecuting farmers who save its herbicide-resistant

(1996); Skogsmyr, Gene DispersalFrom Transgenic Potatoesto Conspecifics: A Field Trial,88

THEOR. APPL. GENET., 770-74 (1994),See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
29. Monsanto, a frequent intervenor in labeling suits, independently sued several dairies
for labeling their products "non-BGH." These companies included Swiss Valley Farms in
Iowa and The Pure Milk and Ice Cream Company in Waco, Texas. See Wesley J. Smith,
'Scorched-Earth' Litigation Corrupts Judicial Process, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, January 9,
1997, at 11A; Growth Hormone for Cows Raises Health Questions,BUFFALO NEWS, April 30,
1996, at B2; Robert Steyer, Monsanto, Texas Dairy Settle Suit, ST. LOUIS PosT-DISPATCH,
July 3, 1995, at 14.
30. Sara M. Dunn, From Flav'r Savr to Environmental Saver? Biotechnology and the
Futureof Agriculture, InternationalTrade, and the Environment, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L
& POL'Y 145, 146 (1998).

31. See Burk, supra note 19, at 296.
32. See discussion Part III, infra.
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"Roundup Ready" soybean seeds.33 Seed-saving is a traditional farming
practice, but since GM seeds are intellectual property, Monsanto and
others can contractually limit use of the seeds to one season,
guaranteeing future sales since farmers must now purchase additional
seed each growing season. Additionally, the farmers must then
purchase their herbicide from Monsanto, since the Roundup Ready
soybeans are specifically altered to withstand Monsanto's own brand of
herbicide. However, since a patent for "Terminator Technology" was
granted last year, the need for prosecuting seed-saving farmers has
become obsolete. The "terminator" gene is a complex of genes that,
when spliced into a crop plane like Roundup Ready soybeans, will
render the seeds sterile after a certain amount of time. This practice
ensures that farmers must return to the company each year for new
seed.3 The legality of this practice is currently being challenged in
federal court.35
Finally, there is evidence that GM crops could destroy the biological
basis of alternative farming methods due to pest and weed resistance.
This is due to the genetic manipulation of bacillus thuringiensis, a
natural pesticide commonly known as "Bt." Bt occurs naturally in the
soil and is relied on heavily by organic farmers. Until now, resistance
has not been a concern because Bt breaks down quickly in sunlight and
organic farmers use it only sparingly. But the splicing of Bt into crops
by GM companies creates a plant that is, throughout its life, deadly to
the pests that eat it 6 While a novel product like this might be an
advantage to GM companies, the widespread and ever-present use of Bt
in plants is likely to lead to insect resistance, thus robbing organic
growers of the safest pesticide available and in effect destroying the
sustainable agriculture that stands in opposition to GM production.'
33. See FOOD BYTES, supra note 23.
34. The "Terminator" patent has attracted unprecedented opposition from farmer's
organizations and environmental groups. Over 1,800 individuals from 54 countries have
written personal protests demanding that the technology be banned by the USDA. See id.
35. See, e.g., Rick Weiss, Food War Claims Its Casualties; High-Tech Crop Fight
Victimizes Farmers, WASHINGTON POST, September 12, 1999, at Al. (Reporting that
antitrust lawsuits are planned for late 1999 against major GM agribusinesses; eight major law
firms have signed on to represent plaintiff farmers with what may be the largest antitrust suit
in history).
36. Maine is the only state that prohibits the use of Bt corn seeds, banned in 1998. See
Sharon Mack, Farmers Hear About Bio-Engineering, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, January 13,
1999. Some strains of Bt produce proteins that are lethal to certain insects with alkaline
digestive tracts. Id.
37. A Cornell University study showed that cross-pollination of Bt from corn plants into
milkweed kills Monarch butterflies. See 399 NATURE 6733 (1999).
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Economic difficulties are not borne solely by farmers. Businesses
face their own problems with GM foods. The lack of any means for
identifying GM foods from their natural counterparts makes it difficult
to source out desired goods for consumers. This sourcing problem
compelled several restaurants to join the current lawsuit against the
FDA?' As one nationally recognized chef says:
People come to [my restaurant] because they trust me [and]
know I'm going to source out the highest quality ingredients in
the market for their dining experience. By not requiring
mandatory labeling and safety testing of all genetically
engineered foods, the government is taking away my ability to
assure customers of the purity of the food they eat at my
restaurants.
2. Environmental Risks
Many fear that GM crops will cause serious genetic pollution and
biosphere damage.4 Examples of environmental problems can be seen
where a single genetic mutation occurs in an organism, even where it
occurs for natural reasons. Recent genetic problems of this sort include
the appearance of citrus canker, chemical resistance, and
transformations of benign bugs into pests.41 As for geneticallyengineered mutations, no one knows if they will cause "gene flow," a
phenomenon where genes are transferred to weedy relatives through
cross-pollination. Gene flow may conceivably create resistance in other
plants, producing strains of "super" weeds or "super" viruses. Crosspollination of gene traits may also compound the problem of antibiotic
resistance.
A basic knowledge of biology lends skepticism to biotech
companies' claim that these environmental problems are but a remote
38. See Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, No. 98-1300 (D. D.C. filed May 27, 1998).

39. Id.
40. See id. Not all uses of genetic engineering are so ominous. In the alternative, many
researchers are using biotechnology in an effort to understand genetic expression, knowledge
of which even now is limited. This knowledge is used to create a sophisticated, organic-based
approach to agriculture, relying on integrated pest management, crop rotation, natural
fertilization, and other sustainable methods. Id.
41. See Scott D. Deatherage, Scientific Uncertainty in Regulating Deliberate Release of
Genetically EngineeredOrganisms: SubstantiveJudicialReview and InstitutionalAlternatives,
11 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 203, 207-08 (1987) (describing economic consequences of single
genetic mutations of the Florida citrus canker, apple maggot, rice brown planthopper, corn
leaf blight, gypsy moth, kudzu vine, and Dutch elm disease).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:237

possibility. Unlike typical food additives, genetic organisms grow,
change, and adapt to new environments and hosts. Genes may replicate
indefinitely. They have the ability to mutate over time, making it
difficult to investigate, control, and prevent unwanted outcomes. This
difficulty is evidenced by the fact that microbiological contamination of
food continues to be a problem despite modem manufacturing
processes.42 Moreover, biotech product research and development
operates from the faulty assumption that a controlled input going into a
biological organism will lead to predictable results. Yet it is clear that
the consequences of introducing GM plants into the food chain cannot
be completely understood at this stage in scientific understanding of
gene expression. Since gene mutations could have devastating effects
on biodiversity, it is critical that regulatory agencies engage in a
complete risk assessment, both in the environmental impact and the
final product.
3. Human Health and Safety Risks
Derivative from the risks in GM crop production
are those
associated with foods that actually end up in the grocery cart. These
risks are highlighted by the experience with GM foods that are already
for sale. The first genetically-engineered crop for sale in the U.S. was
the Flav'r Sav'r Tomato, marketed in 1994." Another widely used
"whole food" is the New Leaf Superior potato, designed with genes of
the Bt pesticide. This crop is among the 45 million acres of corn and
soybeans designed to produce their own pesticides or withstand
herbicides.4 ' These potatoes can be found in store products, fast-food

42. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
43. It has been suggested that liability is the 'Achilles Heel' of the biotech industry. Not
only will insurance companies be unwilling to insure corporations against unknown risks, the
likelihood of gene flow will cause damages to gardeners and farmers unable to sell their
crops. To establish damages, an unwanted gene just needs to show up. See Rick Weiss, Next
Food Fight Brewing Is Over Listing Genes on Labels, WASHINGTON POST, August 15, 1999,
at Al (Testers found traces of genetically engineered corn in organic corn chips made by
Wisconsin company Prima Terra Inc. Corn supplied to the company was tainted through
cross pollination by gene-altered corn. Prima Terra Inc. was forced to recall 87,000 bags of
chips valued at $147,000). Id.
44. Flav'r Sav'r, owned by Calgene, was engineered with flounder genes to withstand
freezing, have longer shelf life, and taste better than "traditional" tomatoes. See Dunn, supra
note 30, at 146. By 1997 the FDA had approved 22 other foods developed with
biotechnology. See id.
45. Michael Pollan, Playing God in the Garden, NEW YORK TIMES SUNDAY
MAGAZINE, October 25, 1998.
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outlets, and produce sections across the country.
The GM product that has received the most attention from
consumers, government, and the media is Posilac, the trade name for
what is commonly called recombinant bovine somatotrophin (rBST) or
bovine growth hormone (BGH)4 The public dispute over BGH hints at
the consumer hostility that may develop over future biotechnology
products because of the conflicting evidence as to its health risks.
BGH was approved by the FDA in 1993,' and is administered to
about three million dairy cows twice a month in order to increase their
milk production.49 Producers claim it is completely safe because there is
no discernible difference between "regular" milk and milk from BGHtreated cows?- This was the basis for the FDA decision not to provide
for special labeling. As such, it is impossible for consumers to know if
they are purchasing BGH-treated milk.
There has been much controversy over use of this hormone since its
introduction, both for human health reasons as well as economic ones.
5 1 Paramount
First, there is conflicting evidence as to the safety of BGH.
are concerns about the high levels of growth hormone, IGH-1, that are
found in milk from cows treated with BGH. IGH-1 has been linked to
46. McDonald's has come under fire for its use of GM food sources, and has been a
symbol for the international dispute of U.S. export of GM corn and soybeans. See
NEWSWEEK, September 13, 1999, at 33. However, one supplier, Archer Daniels Midland, has
responded by announcing it will separate its GM and non-GM soybeans and corn. Id.
47. This Comment refers to the hormone as "BGH". Manufactured by Genetech and
owned by Monsanto corporation, BGH is a synthetic formulation of a naturally occurring
growth hormone in cows. See FDA Charged With Ignoring BGH Hazards, CHEMICAL
MARKET REPORTER, Jan. 4,1999, at 6(1).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Just what is in "regular" milk is an interesting question, since most cows are treated
with antibiotics and hormones whose residues end up in dairy products. There is controversy
over whether these "ordinary" drugs are within levels acceptable to human health: these
include pituitary and steroid hormones, thyroid and hypothalmic hormones, gastrointestinal
peptides and growth factors like IGF-1. Organic milk does not use these treatments. See
infra note 51.
51. Studies have shown rBST increases the levels of insulin-like growth factor 1 (IGF-1)
in milk, which passes into the blood stream of milk consumers. While ingested IGF-1 would
ordinarily be broken down in the stomach, the presence of caesin in milk prevents its
absorption. Furthermore, high levels of IGF-1 are linked to increased incidence of breast and
prostate cancers. See, e.g., Susan E. Hankinson et. al., CirculatingConcentrationsof InsulinLike Growth FactorI and Risk of Breast Cancer,351 LANCET 1393 (1998); June M. Chan et.
al., Plasma Insulin-Like Growth Factor-Iand Prostate CancerRisk- A Prospective Study, 279
SCIENCE 563 (January 23, 1998); P.V. Malvern et. al., PeriparturientChangesin Secretion and
Mammary Uptake of Insulin and in Concentrations of Insulin and Insulin-Like Growth
Factorsin Milk ofDairy Cows, 70 J. DAIRY SCIENCE 2254 (1987).
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several forms of cancer. There is evidence that the IGH-1 is more
potent in BGH-treated milk than in regular milk because it is bound less
firmly to accompanying proteins. 2 However, researchers disagree about
a critical factor: whether the hormone is broken down in the digestive
tract or whether it can enter the blood stream by passing through the
intestinal wall and promote cancers. The National Institutes of Health
observed that it is inconclusive whether the IGF-1 in BGH-treated milk
can affect the esophagus, stomach, or intestines. 3 Despite these
statements, proponents of GM have boldly asserted that the "scientific
literature overwhelmingly supports the safety of [BGH],'' and that
studies from "around the world have failed to unearth any cognizable
threat to human health from [BGH] usage.""
The lack of a regulatory response to this controversy is even more
incredible when international views on agricultural biotechnology are
considered.- For example, after nine years of review, Canada banned
the use of BGH after researchers uncovered evidence that U.S. officials
overlooked data about potential health risks that indicated a need for
additional testing. In response to the Canadian findings, several U.S.
consumer groups have asked the federal government to pull BGH off
the American market and re-evaluate the research used to prove its
safety to the FDA in 1993.
American biotech companies continue to fight diligently to prevent
such a ban from occurring in the U.S. For example, BGH producers
bring lawsuits against state legislatures and private companies who
disclose the presence of BGH on labels.' This is an understandable
52. See Chan, supra note 51.
53. See NIH technical assessment confirmation statement on bovine somatotrophin. 265
JAMA 1423, 1424-25 (1991); R.J. Playford, et. al., Effect of Luminal Growth Factor
Preservationon Intestinal Growth, 341 THE LANCET 843-48 (April 3, 1993); Judith Juskevich,
Bovine Growth Hormone: Human Food Safety Evaluation,SCIENCE, August 24, 1990, at 875,
available in 1990 WL 3304311.
54. See Burk, supra note 19, at 238.
55. Id.
56. Mounting public opposition to rBST and GE crops in general forced European
Commission officials to consider a three to five year moratorium on planting GM crops.
Across Europe, fields of "frankenplants" are uprooted and burned by protestors, and
supermarket chains are attempting to source out non-GE products. See FOOD BYTES, supra
note 24.
57. Canada Rejects Hormone Use, AP ONLINE, January 15, 1999, availablein 1999 WL
2231912. The Health Protection Branch of the Canadian government shows 20 to 30 percent
of rats in a study absorbed rBST into their blood streams and prostate gland; some developed
cysts in the thyroid. See CHEMICAL MARKET REPORTER, supra note 47.
58. See Dunn, supra note 30.
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strategy, given the acknowledgment by one biotech executive that
labeling a product derived from the use of BGH would be "like putting
a skull and crossbones on it. ' 9 BGH producers have also steadfastly
opposed any labeling by manufacturers who do not use rBST: When
dairy manufacturers began using non-BGH labels soon after the drug's
approval, one GM company brought several lawsuits, alleging libel, false
advertising, and commercial disparagement through the use of these
labels.60
The primary problem with GM manufacturers calling public fear of
their product "unfounded" is that there is little information offered to
address the likelihood of damages by the food. This silence, coupled
with a litigious strategy to prevent GM labeling of any kind, produces
great distrust, both of the GM companies and their products.
Consumers and courts alike 1 perceive a covert strategy to suppress
information about BGH, based on the reasoning that consumers' lack of
scientific sophistication ought not be permitted to affect the burgeoning
biotech food business. The absence of GM labeling information has
been called "paternalistic manipulation" of information.6 Yet in most
states, consumers continue to buy rBST treated milk and other GM
products unknowingly, because of suppressing labels despite their desire
to know, and despite evidence that many consumers are still willing to
purchase milk from BGH-treated cows.6'
B. The OrganicMovement

The greatest testament to consumer distrust of GM foods (and
processed foods in general)' is the spectacular growth of the organic
foods industry. Consumers of organic food and dairy products prefer to
avoid the effects of modern industrial farming, the increased yields of
59. See FOOD BYTES, supra note 23.
60. See Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., v. Lumpkin, availablein No. 96 C 2748,1996 WL
495554 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 1996).
61. See Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
62. Id. at 80.
63. Many states such as Wisconsin have approved voluntary labeling schemes for milk
from untreated cows, "Farmer Certified BGH-Free." See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 97.25(3) (West
1998) (authorizing dairy plants, retail food stores, and restaurants to place certification on
dairy label).
64. Although the average consumer does not have information about particular
processing methods, the Nutritional Labeling Act provided information about processed
ingredients: a consumer with average sophistication can discern highly processed foods from
other food; a list of ingredients such as "hydrogenated," "partially hydrogenated," "alkali,"
etc. See Nutritional Labeling and Education Act, 21 U.S.C. 343(r) (1991).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:237

which require enormous amounts of capital-sensitive inputs such as
fertilizer, hormones, antibiotics, pesticides and herbicides, machinery,
and fuel.6
Although sometimes portrayed as "health nuts and
Luddites,"66 the modern organic consumer is no longer the stereotypical
blueberry-growing hippie. Organic agriculture, while only a fraction of
the size of conventional farming, has become a $4.2 billion a year
market with a growth rate of twenty percent per year since 1990.67
While organic food products could once be found only at your local
health food store or co-op, even mainstream retail food chains are now
making shelf space to offer these "pure" foods. As a result of this
growth, consumers are presented with a variety of independent labels to
guide their choices, such as "organically produced,, 69 "ecologically
grown," "natural," "wild," "residue-free," as well as a variety of third
party certifications."
The concern over the modern food production methods is based
upon several factors: First, factory farming has increased the spread of
disease among animals and necessitated widespread use of antibiotics
and pesticides. Producing ever-increasing yields of milk, eggs, and meat
requires use of growth hormones. Second, foods are shipped much
greater distances than they were twenty years ago, even across national
borders. Globalization of the food supply has introduced bacteria and
other organisms into the U.S. with sometimes-disastrous results. Well-

publicized incidents of food scares, food-poisoning epidemics, and mad

65. See Pollan, supra note 45. Typical organic farming methods include complex crop
rotations to prevent buildup of specific pests, planting strips of flowering crops to attract
beneficial insects like ladybugs that eat beetle larvae and aphids, and planting several
varieties. The approach is the antithesis of GE farming in that it focuses on process rather
than end product.
66. Christopher Palmeri, New Age Moo Juice: There's No Scientific Evidence That Says
It's Better For You-And It Costs A Buck More Per Gallon. But Horizon's OrganicMilk is
Flying Off the Shelves, FORBES, October 19, 1998 at 122.
67. See Ben Lilliston, Organicv. "organic":The Corruptionof a Label,THE ECOLOGIST,
July 17, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 12575422.
68. Proponents of a "USDA Organic" certification program allege that 'organic' has no
real meaning and is confusing for consumers. The term generally refers to foods that are as
whole as possible, and either raised without hormones, antibiotics, and natural surroundings,
or grown with natural pesticide methods in a sustainable manner.
69. Stonyfield Farms Yogurt, for example, claims it is "All Natural," and has two of
these independent organic certifications: "Vermont Certified Organic Processor," and
"Organically Produced in Accordance With the California Organic Foods Act of 1990. See
CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 46000 (West 1999).
70. A successful independent labeling scheme can be found in the California Organic
Certification Act, the labels of which are used nationwide and widely recognized. See id.
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cow disease7 ' have "profoundly affected consumer consciousness and
altered market conditions."' Moreover, despite assurances that the
U.S. has one of the safest food supplies in the world, Americans suffer
from a "literal epidemic" of food poisoning, estimated at over 80 million
cases per year.?' Americans also suffer from high rates of immune and
reproductive disorders, obesity, heart disease, and food-and-waterrelated cancers and diseases.74 The hazards presented by pesticides on
fruits and vegetables, hormone and antibiotic residues, fecal or bacterial
contamination of fruits, and meat transported great distances lead many
consumers to seek out organic products.75 Although GM science seeks
to solve some of these problems, the flight of consumers is not likely to
be abated in GM's current state.
III.

THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO GENETIC ENGINEERING

Consumer distrust is aggravated by the fact that adjudication of GM
labeling disputes often turns in favor of keeping information from the
consumer. 6 This section first describes the confused judicial response to
71. For recent news highlights regarding food scares and poisoning incidents, see
generally Lawrence K. Altman, Outbreak of Cyclospora Surprises Health Officials,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 30, 1996, at A22; Tom Daykin, Oscar Mayer Recalls Two
Lunch Meat ProductsForFearof Bacteria Kansas City Illness Led To Testing That Revealed
Presence of Listeria,MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL, January 16, 1999, at 3; Tom Paulson, Odwalla
Juice is E.Coli Source, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, October 31, 1996, at Al; Lisa
Singhania, Tainted Hot Dogs Traced to Zeeland Meat Processor:Bacteria in PackagesKilled
Four, Sickened Scores Across Nation, DETROIT NEWS, January 1, 1999, at A13; Mary Beth
Sheridan, Health Scare Puts Mexico's StrawberryHarvest on Hold, L.A. TIMES, April 9, 1997,
at Al; Mark Skeptic, Small Cartons of Land O'Lakes Milk Recalled, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
February 4, 1999, at 3; SaraLee Says Tests May Tie Bacteria to Its Food, L.A. TIMES, January
2, 1999, at C2; Strawberries at Lunch Leave Youths Exposed to Hepatitis A, SUN-SENTINEL
(Ft. Lauderdale), April 4,1997.
72. Lilliston, supra note 67.
73. See Id.
74. See id.
75. See id. In addition to contamination concerns, many consumers look to organic
foods for the preferred effects of the small-scale production typically associated with organic
farming: survival of small family farms, protecting the rural environment, the humane
treatment of livestock, and locally-grown food. "Our customers have come to recognize our
trade name, Organic Valley: A Family of Farms, as not just a line of quality products, but also
as a philosophical approach to agriculture worth of support. That unusual level of customer
loyalty has become the envy of agribusiness." See press release at Organic Valley Website,
http://www.organicvalley.com (visited February 15,1999).
76. Many consumers are demanding that they be given information on the GM crops
already for sale. The FDA is being taken to court by consumer groups who challenge the
marketing of thirty-three genetically engineered whole foods that are being sold without
labeling or safety testing. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, No. 98-1300 (D. D.C. filed
May 27, 1998). These foods are used as ingredients in processed foods such as soy-based baby
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the issues raised by the two types of GM labeling schemes. In a criticism
of the Second Circuit's decision in International Dairy Foods v.
Amestoy, this section argues that consumer concern presents a
substantial state interest, trumping any First Amendment rights a GM
company may assert. Next, this section sets forth a legal foundation for
federal labeling of GM foods by arguing that a state-compelled labeling
scheme is properly considered a disclosure requirement, and as such
should be held to a less strict review than other compelled commercial
speech.
A. Ad Hoc JudicialReactions-The Amestoy Case
Courts traditionally act as a forum for addressing conflicting public
expectations. However, it is worthwhile to recognize that the judiciary
has another tradition of looking favorably on science and industry and
acting as vehicles for securing public acceptance of new technology.'
This posture can be seen from the first time the Supreme Court
78 a 1980
addressed a biotechnology issue in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
case concerning the marketing of DNA research. The subject of the
patent application was an oil-eating bacterium.7 9 Although not a
product of bio-engineering, the bacterium was rejected by the patent
examiner because it had never existed before in nature, and because
living things were considered not patentable.' The Court held that a
live but human-made organism is patentable subject matter within the
meaning of the patent statute, which provides issuance of patents for
any "manufacture" or "composition of matter. ,8' By enlarging these
meanings, the Court created the potential for similar "inventions,"
including those produced by genetic engineering, to be granted legal
protection.
Courts are presented with one of two possible methods for GM
labeling schemes, each of which present their own legal issues. The first
of these is the state-compelled labeling requirement, usually mandated
by the government on behalf of consumers. Typically, this mandate is in
the form of a disclosure requirement, which compels manufacturers to
formula and popular brands of corn chips. A central issue in this case is the consumer's right
to know about genetic material being engineered into foods.
77.

See
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79.
80.
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447 U.S. 303 (1980).
See id. at 305.
See id. at 306.
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reveal product information on which they would ordinarily prefer to
remain silent." The most common legal defense for a GM company
challenging such a state-imposed requirement would be to appeal to
their First Amendment right "not to speak."83 Under current
constitutional adjudication, the state would then have to show that its
interest trumps that of the manufacturer. Another "negative" type of
state regulation is a complete ban on speech, where a state might forbid
the labeling of accurate product information in the interest of serving a
"substantial" state interest.8'
The second type of labeling scheme, which could be deemed
"positive," is based on the right of an individual manufacturer to make
voluntary disclosures about their product. For example, food producers
desiring to characterize their product as "non-GM," "BGH-free," or
"organically grown" find these labels a useful tool for establishing brand
recognition in a GM-wary marketplace. The most problematic legal
issues for voluntary labeling is that the "non-GM" label is often
challenged as being "misleading" under the FDCA,0 since GM
producers feel it may imply inferiority of their product.
InternationalDairy Foods Association v. Amestoym is the primary

case in which a federal court has dealt with a state initiative to compel
labeling of a GM product. In Amestoy, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals was presented with a challenge to a Vermont statute that
compelled disclosure of dairy products produced with the hormone
rBST ("BGH").
Acknowledging citizens' petitions and a lack of
federal guidance on the matter, the Vermont legislature enacted a BGH
labeling scheme, which involved posting a BGH-information sign in
retail outlets accompanied by a blue rectangle affixed to BGH-produced
products."' In finding for the challenging dairy processors, the court first
82. For a discussion of compulsory labels for rBST on a state level, see Kathleen
Lennon, Note, Government's Udder DisregardFor A Consumer's Right to Information on
rBST: Mandatory Labeling of Milk ProductsShould Be Allowed, 22 VT. L. REV. 433 (1997).
83. Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
84. Nicole B. Casarez, Don't Tell Me What to Say: Compelled Commercial Speech and

the FirstAmendment, 63 MO. L. REV. 929 (1998).
85. Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc. v. Lumpkin, available in No. 96 C 2748, 1996 WL
495554 (N.D. Ill Aug. 28,1996).
86. 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
87. The Vermont statute read: "[i]f rBST has been used in the production of milk or a
milk product for retail sale in this state, the retail milk or milk product shall be labeled as
such." Id. at 69.
88. "rBST Information. THE PRODUCTS IN THIS CASE THAT CONTAIN OR
MAY CONTAIN MILK FROM rBST-TREATED COWS EITHER (1) STATE ON THE
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found that they had demonstrated irreparable harm to their First
Amendment rights because they were required to make an "involuntary
statement"' when offering their products for sale. The court observed
that "[o]rdinarily, it is the purposeful suppression of speech which
constitutes irreparable harm."'a But here, the dairy producers were
compelled to make a disclosure about BGH; the implications of which
they disagreed. The dairy manufacturers argued that for this reason
they deserved more protection from a compelled disclosure than
commercial speech doctrine would ordinarily allow.9 Although the
court did not address this argument directly, they nevertheless applied
the Central Hudson test to determine that Vermont presented no
cognizable harms the statute would prevent; thus, its interest was not
substantial. 92 The court held that "consumer curiosity" alone is never a
substantial enough interest to compel even an accurate statement about
a product.' Relying exclusively on FDA safety findings, the court held
that "it is thus plain that Vermont could not justify the statute on the
basis of "real" harms... [i]t is undisputed that dairy products derived
from herds treated with rBST are indistinguishable from products
derived from untreated herds; consequently, the FDA declined to
require the labeling of [rBST products]."' ' From this basis, the court
jumped to the conclusion that "strong consumer interest and the public's
'right to know"' was insufficient. 9 The court further noted:
Were consumer interest alone sufficient, there is no end to the
information that states could require manufacturers to disclose
about their production methods. For instance, with respect to
cattle, consumers might reasonably evince an interest in knowing
which grains herds were fed, with which medicines they were
PACKAGE THAT rBST HAS BEEN OR MAY HAVE BEEN USED, OR (2) ARE
IDENTIFIED BY A BLUE SHELF LABEL LIKE THIS: [BLUE RECTANGLE] OR (3)
A BLUE STICKER ON THE PACKAGE LIKE THIS. [BLUE DOT]. The United States
Food and Drug Administration has determined that there is no significant difference between
milk from treated and untreated cows. It is the law of Vermont that products made from the
milk of rBST treated cows be labeled to help consumers make informed shopping decisions."
Id. at 70.
89. Id at 71.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. The district court found that "despite the current public debate, the labels required
by [the statute] relate to commercial transactions and are therefore commercial speech." Int'l
Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 898 F. Supp. 246,252 (D. Vt. 1995).
92- See Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67,71 (2d Cir. 1996).
93. Id. at 74.
94. Id. at 69.
95. Id. at 73.
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treated, or the age at which they were slaughtered. Absent,
however, some indication that this information bears on a
reasonable concern for human health or safety or some other
sufficiently substantial government concern, the manufacturers
cannot be compelled to disclose it. Instead, those consumers
interested in such information should exercise the power of their
purses by buying products from manufacturers who voluntarily
reveal it.The court's "slippery slope" reasoning seems heavily influenced by a
sort of technological determinism. Its decision acknowledged only the
FDA position on the safety of BGH and completely sidestepped not
only the consumer demand in avoiding BGH, but also the mass of
conflicting scientific evidence presented to the district court as to BGH's
safety.
The vigorous dissent by Judge Leval in Amestoy is a well-reasoned
approach to the "consumer interest" issues that will continue to arise in
the GM debate. Leval observed that a First Amendment benefit for
commercial speech has never been used for the purpose of withholding
truthful information from consumers, and in effect "stands the
Amendment on its ear."97 Leval's rationale was that the overall policy
of the Amendment is to promote the flow of "accurate, relevant
information. "98 In his view, the most important facts of Amestoy were
omitted from the majority opinion." The "consumer curiosity" was a
trite characterization of a complex set of issues based on evidence
regarding human health, cow health,1® and farm survival.'01 By ignoring
the legislature's position on the issue in deference to the FDA's
position, Leval criticized the majority approach as "paternalistic social
96. Id.
97. Id. at 74 (J. Leval, dissenting).
98. Id.
99. These facts emerged from surveys, from the state of Vermont and the entire country,
which revealed consumer desire for the labeling of rBST milk and overwhelmingly negative
reactions to its use. Citizen reaction was well-documented in the press, in surveys, and in
comments made to legislative committees and the Department of Agriculture. See id. at 75.
100. Curiously, the drug Posilac (rBST), when sold to the farmer, is required to carry a
warning label regarding its effects on the cow. It "states that cows injected with the product
are at increased risk for. various reproductive disorders, 'clinical mastitis [udder infections]
(visibly abnormal milk), digestive disorders such as indigestion, bloat, and diarrhea, enlarged
hocks and lesions, and swellings that may be permanent." Id. at 78.
101. See Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 898 F. Supp. 246,251 (D. Vt. 1995) (noting
various local interests and concluding that "[s]tates have traditionally acted to protect
consumers by regulating foods produced and/or marketed within their borders") (quoting
Grocery Mfrs. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d 993,1003 (2d. Cir. 1985)).
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engineering."
Judge Leval found "alarming and dangerous" the fact that the
majority relied exclusively on the FDA position on rBST in finding that
' 2
consumer concern could not be considered "real" or "cognizable. 0
Although the dairy processors argued that health concerns are
"hypothetical" since there is no conclusive study on health risk in rBST,
given that genetic manipulation of food is new and controversial, FDA
tests could not possibly cover long-term effects on human health."
Furthermore, the judge observed that many factors inhibit government
agencies from adequate risk assessment, including inadequate time,
budget, sampling errors, and industry pressure.' 4 "To suggest that a
government agency's failure to find a health risk in a short-term study of
a new genetic technology should bar a state from requiring simple
disclosure of the use of that technology where its citizens are concerned
about health risks would be unreasonable and dangerous. "'05
Finally, Leval directly addressed the commercial speech issue that
the majority ignored. Because they were compelled to make statements
about rBST beyond merely stating that the milk contained it, the dairy
producers claimed they were entitled to First Amendment protection
paralleling that of political speech." Here, Leval reasoned that the
speech could not reasonably be attributed to the producers because the
retailers were the ones displaying the actual sign." Moreover, the label
on the sign conveyed the FDA's position on safety and that the State of
Vermont was the party communicating the information." Therefore, a
consumer could not reasonably conclude that the "speech" was that of
the dairy manufacturer. 19 While this is an accurate observation, Leval
suggests that a GM label's conformity to First Amendment law is based
on this factor.'
B. Labeling GM Foods Reflects a SubstantialState Interest.
The Amestoy decision is curious in light of contemporary
commercial speech jurisprudence, including those cases applying the
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 76.
See id. at 78.
See id. at 77.
Id. at 77.
See id. at 79.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 80.
See id.
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Central Hudson test.' First, observers have noted that the Supreme
Court appears to be taking a new approach to commercial speech,
showing a "growing acceptance of 'the preservation of a fair bargaining
process' as the rationale for commercial speech regulation."'
In most
instances where a court recognizes a state interest in informed
consumers, it has been an interest in informing them of a difference in
product characteristics and preventing the suppression of accurate
information. Second, the policy of providing information to consumers
has always been a primary concern in commercial speech and disclosure
cases and has overcome even the higher standard of review applied to
complete bans on speech.
In Virginia Board of Pharmacyv. Virginia Consumers Council,"' the
Supreme Court found that paternalistic assumptions by courts that the
public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial information unwisely
cannot justify a decision to suppress that information."4 Here, the state
of Virginia had banned the advertising of drug prices."' The Court
stated that an alternative to suppressing information is "to assume that
this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their
own best interests if only they are well enough informed ....
Additionally, "the proper allocation of resources" requires that
consumer decisions be "intelligent and well-informed." "7
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island"a considered a challenge to a state
statute prohibiting liquor price advertising. The Court made several
important observations in finding that the statutory ban did not bear a
reasonable relation to a state interest in promoting "temperance."""
First, the ban was against truthful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful
111. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). In Central Hudson, the test set forth to determine if government restriction of
commercial speech is permissible rests on four factors: 1) whether the expression concerns
lawful activity and is not misleading, 2) whether the government's interest is substantial, 3)
whether the restriction directly serves the asserted interest, and 4) whether the restriction is
no more extensive than necessary. The last two factors look for a "close fit" between the

state interest and the restriction. See id.
112. Nicole B. Casarez, Don't Tell Me What to Say: Compelled Commercial Speech and
the FirstAmendment, 63 MO. L. REV. 929, 946 (1998) (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,426 (1993)).
113. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
114. See id.

115. See id. at 749-50.
116. Id. at 770.
117. Id. at 765.

118. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
119. Id. at 490.
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product and did not concern any interest in consumer protection. "The
First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that
seek to keep people in the dark for what government perceives to be
their own good. That teaching applies equally to state attempts to
deprive consumers of accurate information about their chosen
products....",2 o0 Moreover, a state interest "to keep legal users of a
product.., ignorant in order to manipulate
their choices in the
12 1
marketplace.., is per se illegitimate .... "
The Court came to a similar conclusion in Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Company.'" This case dealt with a federal prohibition against revealing
the alcoholic percentage content of malt beverages on product labels. In
applying the Central Hudson test, the goal of preventing brewers from
attracting customers based on the alcoholic content of the beer was
rejected as a substantial state interest." The government's rationale on
suppressing the alcohol content information was that restricting
disclosure of information about a product characteristic would
"decrease the extent to which consumers will select the product on the
basis of that characteristic."124
In each of these commercial speech cases, a strict review is required
because the state had imposed a complete ban on speech. The Central
Hudson test is a tough yardstick, but one that the facts of Amestoy
would pass over. There are legitimate state interests in compelling
disclosure of the process by which certain products were manufactured
that may be questionable bases on which to rest a state interest in
restricting speech. For example, millions of consumers refrain from
genetically engineered foods because of ethical and religious principles.
For example, many Jews and Muslims need to avoid foods with
substances from specific animals.'" Vegetarians need to avoid animalderived substances.
There are moral beliefs that genetically
manipulated food is incompatible with the integrity of nature. GM
proponents dismiss these concerns. In the case of BGH, they discredit
the clear preference of consumers by stating "[m]ost Americans appear
firmly committed to eating, wearing, and drinking a variety of products
120. Id. at 503.
121. Id. at 487.

122. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
123. See id.
124. Id. at 484.

125. These regulations of "kosher" or "organic," however, merely specify standards a
product must meet for a manufacturer to hold its product out as having that process. See
Burk, supranote 19, at 308.
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obtained at the expense of cattle, and are unlikely to become overly
concerned if the animals are further exploited for their benefit." 1 6 Yet
surveys, like the one in Amestoy, confirm that these concerns are indeed
widespread."l Protecting the health and welfare of citizens against
unknown risks of genetic engineering would seem to be a legitimate
state interest. Even if it were not so, the Amestoy court erred in placing
a strict standard on what was a disclosure requirement.
C. State-Compelled GM Labeling is a DisclosureRequirment.
First Amendment rights have long recognized not only the right to
speak, but also the right to silence. When speech is related to political,
religious, or other ideological content, full scope of First Amendment
rights apply. However, commercial speech has a somewhat lower
constitutional status in recent jurisprudence. Disclosure requirements
are typically relegated to this status, and courts therefore consider them
to be within a state's legitimate power. Package labeling is considered
advertising. As such, it ought to be considered with a less strict review
since it does not merit the high standards of full First Amendment
rights. These applications can be found in decisions that deal with
disclosure requirements rather than outright bans on commercial forms
of speech.
In Riley v. National Federationof the Blind of North Carolina,Inc.,
the Supreme Court held that professional fund-raisers could not be
compelled to disclose to potential charitable donors the percentage of
funds going to costs and fees as opposed to charity." The decision
indicated that when speech is fully protected, the law compelling that
speech is subject to the same constitutional test as a law that restricts
it." Although at the time of the Riley decision commercial speech was
generally seen as an inferior category of expression, it nevertheless
suggests that if First Amendment scrutiny is weak for a ban on
information that increases information to consumers, then commercial
disclosure requirements should also be subject to a lower First
Amendment standard for the same reason: to promote a fair bargaining
process.
Several attorney advertising cases speak to this issue. In Zaudererv.

126.
127.
128.
129.

Burk, supranote 19, at 229.
Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d. Cir. 1996).
487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988).
See id.
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Office of Disciplinary Counsel," the Court pointed out the "material
differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions
on speech."131 It found that "disclosure requirements trench much more
narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibitions on
speech .... 132 Zauderer made this distinction by refusing to apply the
full Central Hudson test to a disclosure requirement; the test was
watered down by eliminating the "least restrictive means" prong of the
test.33
Zauderer suggests that disclosure requirements need only be
reasonably related to a state interest in consumer protection in order to
pass constitutional muster."
Some critics believe that disclosure
requirements ought to be taken out of commercial speech category
completely and afforded no First Amendment protection whatsoever.
Their argument is based on a dual premise that consumer interest
cannot be subordinated to commercial loss and that a legislature ought
to be given deference to protect consumers' right to informed decisionmaking.
Finally, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,35 the Court again displayed
anti-paternalism in establishing that attorneys have the right to advertise
their services and fees. The state law which restricted attorney
advertising was found to "inhibit the free flow of commercial
information and to keep the public in ignorance."' 36 The Court also
noted that consumer protection was the only interest that could justify
the state's requirement
for advertisers to provide additional information
137
about their products.
The commercial speech cases suggest that consumer curiosity, when
appropriately characterized as a prophylactic measure against consumer
deception, seems to demand a GM disclosure requirement, especially in
an environment of substantial consumer petitioning of the state as in
Amestoy.'
They imply that the consumer is in the best position to
determine the materiality of information to their decision-making as to
food products. Given the uncertainty as to the safety of GM products, a
130.
131.
132133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

471 U.S. 626 (1985).
Id. at 650.
Id. at 651.
See id.
See id.
443 U.S. 350 (1977).
Id. at 365.
See id. at 384.
See Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 67 (2d. Cir. 1996).
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legislature seems well within its legitimate power to compel disclosure of
their use in the food supply.
D. The FDCA Challenge
Even after passing over First Amendment hurdles, any statecompelled GM labeling scheme must still overcome challenges of
violating the FDCA. However, as evidenced in the Amestoy decision,
the FDCA offers little practical guidance for analyzing GM issues. At
least one court has recognized the difficulty this imposes on judicial
decision-making.

In Stauber v. Shalala,'39 plaintiffs challenged the

FDA's decision not to require labeling of rBGH-treated milk under the
FDCA. The district court was presented with evidence roughly similar
to that in Amestoy: frightened consumers and concerns about the safety
testing on BGH-treated milk.' 40 The FDA's approval of the drug was
challenged as "arbitrary and capricious" '4 under the Administrative
Procedure Act. 42 The District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin observed:
If there is a difference, and consumers would likely want to know
about the difference, then labeling is appropriate. If, however,
the produet does not differ in any significant way from what it
purports to be, then it would be misbranding to label the product
as different, even if consumers misperceive the product as
different. In the absence of evidence of a material difference
between rBST-derived milk and ordinary milk, the use of
consumer
143 demand as the rationale for labeling would violate [the
DCA].
As in Amestoy, the court ultimately deferred to the FDA." Yet as
one observer has noted, "[a]bsent statutory command, courts are
understandably reluctant to overturn complex scientific conclusions on
the merits. '"45 But as one critic of the Stauber decision has pointed out,
by "[u]sing the precedent that disallows courts to consider any evidence
that is not part of the FDA record, the court declined to consider any of
the plaintiffs' complaints ... [in order to] bar consideration of any kind
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

895 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Wis. 1995).
See id.
Id. at 1191.
5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(a).
Stauber,895 F. Supp. at 1193.
See id. at 1197.
Deatherage, supra note 41, at 236.
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of nonagency reviewed data, whether or not it could have been part of
the agency record." 6
The district court recognized that it is unrealistic for the judiciary to
defer exclusively to scientific studies that, due to limited safety testing,
cannot completely address the issues presented at bar.14 7 It is argued
that courts should use a more encompassing standard of scrutiny than
the "substantial evidence" standard." Stauber specifically suggested
that "in the future it would be helpful to reviewing courts for the FDA
to set out the factors it looks at in determining whether a particular risk
is a manageable one."'49 Stauber's criticism suggests that to legitimately
presume the propriety of an FDA position, the agency needs to provide
more guidance and an explicit basis for its determination. Until such
guidance with respect to genetically engineered ingredients is
developed, courts will continue to rely on the FDA in neglect of
consumer demand for information as well as any state legislative
initiatives designed to compensate for the lack of federal guidance.
IV.

REGULATORY AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES

To GENETIC

ENGINEERING

The response of agencies and Congress to the food safety issues
presented by genetic engineering has been ineffective. First, as
commercial biotechnology emerged over the last few decades, its unique
issues were merely absorbed into the current regulatory structure for
food, drugs, environmental issues, and agricultural production. This
failure to adopt a comprehensive approach has resulted in system
loopholes, inadequate definitions, and insufficient risk assessment of
GM food products. Second, Congressional efforts to create labels for
"organic" food instead of GM food is misguided. The FDA and
Congress should revise and coordinate their efforts to regulate GM food
safety.
There is no comprehensive regulatory scheme for food produced
through GM methods. The FDA itself has not sought any additional
statutory authority to deal with GM food products." ° The FDA, as well
as other agencies involved in food oversight, contend that existing
146. Emily Marden, RecombinantBovine Growth Hormone and the Courts:In Search of
Justice, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 617, 634 (1998).
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Stauber,895 F.Supp. at 1192.
150. See Degnan, supra note 4, at 199.
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authority is sufficient to ensure that genetically-engineered food is safe
for consumers."'
The federal agencies that oversee food production are the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), the U.S. Department of Agriculture

(USDA), and to a limited extent, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Although the agency
functions appear discrete, the complexity of biotechnology creates
significant jurisdictional overlap. In the Final Policy Statement for
Research and Regulation of Biotechnology Processes and Products, the
USDA observed that the largest number of negative comments
addressed the potential for overlapping jurisdiction between agencies."'
These criticisms included the competing claims of both USDA and EPA
to regulate agricultural micro-organisms, the potential for delays in
regulatory decisions because of jurisdictional disputes, and the
possibility for states acting independently because of the lack of federal
oversight."
The USDA agreed that "there is the potential for
overlapping jurisdiction among the Federal agencies involved in
regulating biotechnology products."'-"
The USDA regulates genetically-engineered plants through a
division called the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS). APHIS is authorized to regulate "organisms and products
altered or produced through genetic engineering which are plant pests
or which there is reason to believe are plant pests."' 55 This agency must
regulate GM environmental assessments and field tests, but exempts
corn, soybeans, cotton, potatoes, tomatoes, and tobacco. Curiously, all
of these products are widely planted GM crops at this time, yet their
producers are required only to notify USDA that field tests will occur.
However, field tests require extensive precautions to avoid
contamination of nearby wildlife.
These precautions involve
transporting plants to the site in closed containers, thoroughly cleaning
the test plot equipment before and after use, and depending on the
plant, blocking cross-pollination by bagging flowers, keeping insects
from carrying pollen out by putting up cages, removing the plant's
reproductive structures, and isolating the plants from other crops.

151. See Statement of Policy for Regulating Products of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,309 (June 26, 1986).
152. See 51 Fed. Reg. 23,336,23,346 (1986).

153. See id
154. Id.
155. 58 Fed. Reg. 17056 (1993) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
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The EPA also has regulatory oversight over genetically-engineered
plants-a power derived from two Congressional acts. First, the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) gives the agency
responsibility for pesticides. FIFRA authorizes EPA to set tolerances
or establish exemptions from tolerance levels of pesticide residues on or
in food crops. Since many GM plants are engineered to resist pests, the
EPA is involved in regulating pesticide levels in the plant, but has no
responsibility for the final product sold to the consumer.
It is important to remember that most commercial biotech
applications presently involve only the transfer of one gene to convey
one trait. Yet technology is quickly approaching which permits multiple
gene transfers for multiple modifications. Without a comprehensive
approach to regulate these changes, a best-case scenario will have the
administrative process facing increasing demands and costs to catch up.
In the worst case, GM foods will slip through the regulatory system in
increasing numbers, eventually flooding the food supply with unlabeled,
genetically-manipulated foods.
A. FDA Regulatory Authority is Insufficient to Assess GM Safety

The FDA has the primary responsibility for regulating food
additives and new foods. "6 "The mission of [FDA] is to ensure that (1)
food is safe, pure, and wholesome... [u]nder the foods program, FDA
sets food standards; evaluates food additives and packaging for potential
11157
health hazards; conducts research to reduce food borne disease ....
The primary tool for accomplishing this mission is the food label. The
FDCA and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act establish the
requirements for a food label,'" whose fundamental purpose is to
meaningfully inform, warn, and instruct.159
Although the FDA is not explicitly authorized to require label
warnings, they have nevertheless published several labeling
requirements in the past: warnings against dangerous uses of a product,
special dietary uses, nutritional quality guidelines, and for particular
food additives such as salt, aspartame, saccharine, and fruit juice
156. FDA is required to determine the safety of animal drugs.
Cosmetic Act, § 406,21 U.S.C. 346 (1938).

Food, Drug, and

157. PETER BARTON HuTr & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 21

(1991).
158. There are four main components of a food label as defined by the FDCA: the
common name or identity of the item, the quantity, name and location of manufacturer, and
ingredient and nutrition information. See 21 U.S.C.A § 348 (West Supp. 1999).
159. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 343 (West Supp. 1999).
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products.' 60
In May of 1992, the FDA determined that foods derived from GM
plant varieties would be regulated no differently unless "special
circumstances" apply. 61 This policy ignores a large problem inherent in
the FDA guidelines for a food label defining these special
circumstances. The labeling element most likely to become outdated
with the approach of GM crops is the "common name" or "identity" of
a product. The "common name" implication is that although the end
product is considered a "potato," it may be "altered so that its usual
name no longer accurately describes its basic nature or characterizing
properties,"" as when the nutritional value is changed. Geneticallyenhanced potatoes would not necessarily be altered in this way. For
example, a tomato to which a non-occurring element has been added,
such as calcium, would have to disclose this difference. Therefore, the
FDA cannot address GM processes due to the statutory language
focusing on the qualities of the "final product."1" This focus has
impeded efforts to allow even voluntary labeling of genetically
engineered foods.
1. FDA Regulation of Bovine Growth Hormone
Despite the lack of specific guidelines for GM products in general,
the FDA issued interim guidelines for the voluntary labeling of bovine
growth hormone in February 1994.' Voluntary labeling schemes are
well-suited to organic and other producers that wish to distinguish
themselves as "non-GM" foods. These guidelines state that labels must
be truthful, not misleading, and must include a qualifier that FDA had
approved the hormone.6'
Dairy manufacturers in many states followed the voluntary labeling
guidelines. A handful of states went a step further, refusing to permit
any "anti-rBGH" labeling by manufacturers who wanted to promote
their products as not being derived from use of the controversial
hormone. Among those states that banned "no-BGH" labels was
160.

FOOD

& DRUG

LAW INSTITUTE, RICHARD M. COOPER, ED., FOOD AND DRUG

LAWV (1991).
161. 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (1992). These circumstances are unexpected genetic effects,
known toxicant levels, altered nutrient level, significantly different composition, allergenicity,
antibiotic resistance potential, and issues specific to animal feeds. Id.
162. Burk, supra note 19, at 254.
163. 21 U.S.C.A § 343 (West 1999).
164. See Interim Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 6280 (1994).
165. Id.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:237

Illinois, whose state officials were taken to court in May of 1996 by
several dairy product manufacturers.1"6 These companies, including Ben
& Jerry's, Stonyfield Farm, Whole Foods Market, and Organic Valley,
were advised by the Director of Public Health that sales of their
products under an "rBGH-free" label would violate provisions of the
Illinois Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.' 67 In a press release, plaintiff Ben
& Jerry's stated:
We believe our commitment to natural ingredients and to family
farming... expressed through our products.., is an important
part of our success ....We believe our business depends in part
on our ability to let our customers know that we oppose the use
of rBGH; we want to assure them that our milk and cream do not
come from cows treated with this laboratory hormone.'68
These producers demonstrated that the restriction on speech was
also burdensome on commerce because the logistics involved in
interstate food distribution preclude using different packaging for
different states.
Although a settlement was eventually reached in favor of permitting
"non-BGH" labels such as those used by Ben & Jerry's, 6 9 the companies
still questioned the need for the FDA "qualifier" and whether any
government agency has the ability to force a food manufacturer to
accept and espouse the FDA position on such a controversial issue.
2. Ensuring Adequate Risk-Assessment
Ideally, the stringency of a regulatory scheme is equivalent to the
risk it seeks to prevent. Much of the controversy surrounding the lack
of regulation centers on the fact that many of the perceived risks are in
dispute or incapable of quantification at this stage of technology. The
question is whether it is appropriate to assume genetic manipulation of
166. Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc. v. Lumpkin, available in No. 96 C 2748, 1996 WL
495554 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 28, 1996).
167. See id.
168. Press Release dated May 7,1996 (on file with the author).
169. Currently, Ben & Jerry's cartons bear labels on the top of the lid and back panel:
"WE OPPOSE RECOMBINANT BOVINE GROWTH HORMONE. The family farmers
who supply our milk and cream pledge not to treat their cows with rBGH. The FDA has said
no significant difference has been shown and no test can now distinguish between milk from
rBGH treated and untreated cows. Not all the suppliers of our other ingredients can promise
that the milk they use comes from untreated cows." Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc. v.
Lumpkin, availablein No. 96 C 2748, 1996 WL 495554 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 1996).
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foods to be safe for human health and the environment until it is
conclusively proven otherwise, at which point it may be too late to
impose controls.
The FDA says it is succeeding in adapting to the new science. Yet
the example it gives of their "successful adaptation" to GM foods is
pulling them into the current categorical structure. ° Under the current
reasoning, because moth genes are in themselves safe, their genetic
presence within an edible item such as a potato must also be safe. This
reasoning seems incongruous with the traditional approach to riskassessment, where data accumulates on a product, experience with it
grows, and the tendency toward strict regulation relaxes. Inexplicably,
that is not the stance the law has taken with GM products and their
introduction into the food supply.
Author Robert Bohrer describes this typical regulatory life cycle of a
new technology: the first stage occurs where there is an absence of data
concerning the variety of possible risks involved in the new process."'
Typically, this yields a stringent regulatory framework."
As data
accumulates, experience enables a better assessment of risk."
Technology progresses, more data becomes available, and the
regulatory approach is reassessed and relaxed when appropriate. 74 The
open question, however, is how to know when it is "appropriate" to
loosen regulation. Clearly, an appropriate regulatory structure can be
developed only after a meaningful attempt at qualitative risk
assessment.
An appropriate assessment of biotech products would include the
market nature of the risk, the complexity of genetic manipulation and its
potential results. 75 An example of this standard of risk assessment can
be found in EPA environmental requirements, which are, for the most
part, a stringent regulatory scheme. 76
With respect to biotechnology, current FDA regulations are based
on simplistic assumptions, which limit the ability to adequately regulate
GM products. First, its risk assessment focuses not on the biotech
170. IVER P. COOPER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 1994.
171. See ROBERT A. BOHRER, FROM RESEARCH TO REVOLUTION: SCIENTIFIC,
BUSINESS, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE NEW BIOTECHNOLOGY 102 (1987).
172. See id.
173. See id.

174. See id.
175. See id. at 103-06.
176. See id. Bohrer also points out that regulatory frameworks are affected by ups and
downs of the economy: during well-off times, there is less regulation, and vice versa. See id.
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process, but on its end products. This means that the potential for
physiological altering of crops to produce desired traits is not viewed as
inherently different from whole foods, or from those selectively bred.
Second, the need for oversight is disregarded where there is no "known"
risk. Those risks that are in dispute, as is the case with most GM
products, are considered too remote to expend the cost of their
regulation. Third, FDA risk assessment does not analyze social and
economic effects that may follow introduction of a GM product, such as
effect of BGH on smaller economies of scale. The regulatory approach
to biotech should consider the magnitude of the risks instead of the
probabilities offered up to the agencies by GM companies seeking
permits. Meeting this challenge will require not only additional funds,
but also explicit statutory guidance.
B. Congressional(In)action

Before the FDA has the statutory room to perform testing and
compel labeling of GM foods, congressional action is required.
However, current congressional action in this area is going in the wrong
direction. A current proposal would make it impossible to identify
"pure food" under an overall scheme that provides no labeling of GM,
corrupts the traditional definition of the word "organic," and prevents
independent, voluntary labeling. This effectively holds consumers
hostage and destroys meaningful choice as well as any viable
alternatives to GM food. Rather than devising a long-term solution to
adapt to GM foods and processes, Congress has wrongly focused on
labeling "non-GM" foods, which is at best a stopgap measure.
In 1990, Congress passed the Organic Foods Production Act to
alleviate confusion and create a uniform organic standard in order to
facilitate interstate commerce. " The result of this initiative, which was
passed to the USDA, has been a dismal failure. 8 After eight years,
USDA still has not come up with a workable policy for the "USDA
Organic" certification. It is not difficult to understand why this delay
has occurred, as the scheme has had checkered progress from the start.
For example, the USDA has been a traditional promoter of the latest

177. The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990,7 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6522 (1994).
178. See, e.g. Kenneth Amaditz, The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 and Its
Impending Regulations: A Big Zero For Organic Food?, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 537 (1997).
For a discussion of scientific publications and their influence on administrative agencies such
as the FDA, see Lars Noah, Sanctifying Scientific Peer Review: Publication as a Proxy for
Regulatory DecisionMaking, 59 U. Prrr. L. REv. 677 (1998).
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technologies developed by agribusiness and biotech companies."9 The
official advisory board in charge of making recommendations, the
National Organic Standards Board (NOSB), has seen their policy
proposals disregarded by the agency at every turn. Under USDA
control, the proposals for "organic"" standards include not only the use
of genetic engineering, but also permit use of nuclear irradiation,
pesticides, toxic sewage sludge fertilizer, intensive confinement of farm
animals, and other practices. 1 '
More disturbing is the USDA's proposal that it be given the power
to regulate or prohibit voluntary "eco-labels" of any kind. Any
voluntary labeling information that implies "organic" production would
be prohibited. This may include labels that say, for example, "produced
without synthetic pesticides," "pesticide-free farm," "[n]o growth
stimulants administered," "raised without antibiotics," and "ecologically
produced."1 8 Additionally, the nation's 11 state and 33 independent
certifying agencies" may be prohibited from certification and labeling
using standards higher than the USDA minimum. It appears, however,
that this proposal would have limited success in light of recent court
settlements involving similar issues."

Many observers feel that the only thing preventing organic standards
from succumbing to the effects of "agency capture" is the hue and cry
from those consumers who created the spectacular growth in the organic
market."
The proposed organic standards were open for public
comment until March 1998, but the definitions for "organic" met with
vehement opposition, which delayed action until the end of the year."
179. See Lilliston, supranote 67.
180. The comment period on these definitions was extended to December 30, 1998. The
definitions, if approved, will appear on the National List, published in the Federal
Regulations.
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. See press release at Organic Valley website, http://www.organicvaey.com (visited
February 15,1998).
184. See Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc. v. Lumpkin, available in No. 96 C 2748, 1996
WL 495554 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 28,1996).
185. Under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1940, producers who wish to participate
in the USDA's certification programs must request and pay for the inspections. There could
be legal problems with this requirement combined with the compulsory characteristics of the
"USDA Organic" program if it prohibits use of the word "organic" or independent labeling
schemes. See, e.g., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
186. See Rick Franzen, Will GATT Take A Bite Out of the OrganicFood ProductionAct
of 1990?, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 399 (1998) (one proposal would allow beef fed up to
twenty percent non-organic food to carry the "USDA Certified Organic" label).
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Federal oversight of GM food labeling is preferable for another
reason: conflicts will arise to the extent that "local judgments concerning
the safety and desirability of biotechnology differ from those of federal
authority."1" GM advocates say that state assistance in furthering an
"ideological" crusade can hardly be called a legitimate reason to burden
interstate commerce. Yet even with a "legitimate" consumer interest in

origin labeling being postulated, state regulation would still face
demanding requirements to overcome their burden on commerce. For
this reason, federal labeling is appropriate.
V. ENSURING CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE BIOTECH CENTURY

It would be difficult to conceive of any topic of discussion
that could be of greater concern and interest to all Americans
than the safety of the food that they eat.
District Court Judge Mary Lou Robinson'8
A rational strategy to label GM foods must be based on sound
research and acknowledge the limits to current scientific knowledge
about genetic processes. This strategy requires an approach that
respects both sides of the GM debate. First, the regulatory structure
must be amended to reflect consumer concerns about food safety.
Second, a labeling scheme should be based on the need to monitor GM
products in the food supply. Moreover, the label should facilitate
consumer access to current, credible information about GM safety.
Finally, the government should abandon its regulatory efforts for "nonGM" labels. This section concludes by discussing the suggestions for a
new food safety agency.
A. Amending the FDCA

Several amendments to the FDCA have been adopted that
encompass consumer needs and cover risks.'8 The FDA has relied
mainly on Section 403(a)(1) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) for these amendments and would presumably do so again for
guidance on labeling GM foods. Section 403(a)(1) sets forth the criteria
for determining "misbranded" or "adulterated" food. However, GM
187. See Burk, supra note 19, at 228.
188. Texas Beef Group v. Oprah Winfrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d 858,862 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
189. For a description of these amendments, see Degnan, supra note 4, at 162.
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foods escape the reach of this provision, becoming subject to it only if a
problem arises post-marketing, when already in the hands of consumers.
Additionally, since transferred genetic material is presumed to be
Generally Recognized As Safe (GRAS), it is currently exempt from premarket approval or testing under this section.
1. Section 403 Definitions of "False and Misleading."
The basic prohibition in food labeling is false or misleading labeling,
regulated by Section 403(a) of the FDCA. An article of food is
misbranded if "its labeling [is] false or misleading in any [way].""
Taken together with other guidelines, a label can be misleading not only
for what it suggests to the consumer but also for what it fails to disclose.
An unresolved question is whether nondisclosure of a genetic
engineering production process is "misleading" or "material"
information.
Under current regulations, a GM food, such as pesticide-containing
New Leaf Superior potatoes, need only be labeled under two conditions.
The first condition is if the item contains an ingredient commonly
considered an allergenic food.
However, this presumption of
"misleading" is refutable by the manufacturer. If the manufacturer
argues successfully, the item is exempted from the label requirement.
The second condition is if the nutritional content of a food is changed.
For example, when a tomato is developed that no longer contains its
naturally-occurring vitamin C, that fact must be disclosed. GM foods
completely elude the "misleading" standard, because the FDA's view is
that the method by which a plant is developed by a plant breeder is not
"material" information in a legal sense."' This unworkable premise has
already become irrelevant with advances in biotechnology. It overlooks
the very stage where risks occur and focuses on the end product where it
becomes too late for prevention of catastrophic outcomes.
Judicial decisions show a traditional disposition toward giving
section 403 a high level of protection. Though there are no cases
directly on point with GM foods, several cases allude to a broad
meaning of "false and misleading." In case of United States v. NinetyFive Barrels (More or Less) Alleged Apple Cider Vinegar,"g the
Supreme Court deemed "misbranded" vinegar made from dehydrated
rather than fresh apples. The Court observed that "[d]eception may
190. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (West Supp. 1999).
191. ld.
192. 265 U.S. 438 (1924).
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result from the use of statements not technically false or which may be
literally true."" Further, the misrepresentation was found to be of the
vinegar itself, its substance, and ingredients. 4 The Court observed that
the FDCA requires no disclosure concerning production. When
considered independently of the product, the method of manufacture is
not material. Yet with GM food products, it is illogical to consider the
manufacture independently of the product. "Misleading" ought to
encompass an absence of information about genetic alteration of food
since the end product is materially different from the traditionally bred
variety. Indeed, to profit from their products, GM companies are
required to prove this difference in applying for patent protection.
Many other cases show how broadly the Court interprets "misleading"
labeling information.'
2. "Food Additive."
Extensive requirements for premarket safety testing apply to food
additives. ""6 The traditional definition of this term is perhaps the
biggest obstacle to testing and labeling GM products. Unless an
additive is considered GRAS, it is subject to substantial premarket
testing and approval. GM foods are considered GRAS and are not
subject to the "additive" definition unless it is a "protein, carbohydrate,
fat or oil, or other substance that differs significantly in structure,
function, or composition from substances currently found in food."'"
For example, genes from virtually any source may be imposed in a
soybean. This soybean in turn becomes a food additive when it is used
to make bread, chips, or baby formula. However, FDA has rarely ruled
on GRAS status of whole foods when used as a component. The agency
does not explain how it would become aware of GM foods that may
require submission of food additive petitions because of genetic
manipulation, since the focus is solely on the final product.
According to the definition of "food additive," whole foods may

193. Id. at 443.
194. See id. at 445.
195. See United States v. An Article of Food... Labeled Nuclomin, 482 F.2d 581 (8th
Cir. 1973); United States v. An Article of Food... "Manischewitz... Diet Thins," 377 F.
Supp. 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. An Article of Food... Containing 432 Cartons,
More or Less, Containing 6 Individually Wrapped Candy Lollipops of Various Flavors, 292 F.
Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
196. 21 U.S.C.A. § 343(m) (West Supp. 1999).
197. See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg.
22,990 (1992).

1999]

FEDERAL FOOD LABELING LAW

indeed be "additives when used as components of prepared foods."' 8
Congress, however, has never, before now, had a reason to require
premarket approval of traditional foods. Because of this language,
FDA has never considered it necessary to examine whether potatoes,
tomatoes, carrots, or milk are in fact GRAS. A tomato is considered a
tomato, whether it is a Beefsteak tomato grown by a California farmer,
or a Flav'r Sav'r tomato developed in a lab. If it is found in the after
market to be "poisonous or deleterious," it can be excluded from
commerce, but only if the FDA can show that the additive "may render"
the food injurious.' 99 This means that the food needs to cause an allergic
or other reaction in a consumer. Yet there is no indication of just how
consumers would be able to identify the GM food as the source of their
allergies if it is not labeled.
Disturbingly, it is the applicant company that determines whether a
new gene protein is GRAS. The GM companies are the ones who
decide whether they need to consult with FDA by following "decision
trees" that act as a guide. Yet as a Monsanto executive pointed out,
"Monsanto should not have to vouchsafe the safety of biotech food, our
interest is in selling as much of it as possible. Assuring its safety is the
FDA'sjob. ," '

The emphasis on "informal, ad hoc assessment [by the FDA]
perpetuates uncertainty for innovative companies and may weaken
public confidence."2'
It also creates loopholes through which GM
foods, with their novel, genetically-spliced "ingredients," slip into the
food supply untested. For example, although one might think the Bt
pesticide genes in New Leaf Superior potatoes would qualify as a "novel
substance" for a potato, and therefore an "additive," it is not required to
be labeled. This is because pesticides themselves are exempt from FDA
regulation. The EPA in turn has no authority over food products. It
instead works from the assumption that if the original potato is safe, and
the Bt protein genes in themselves are considered by the agency to be
safe, then the whole New Leaf package is presumed safe.M This is a
logical fallacy. Food "additives" need to include whole foods that are
produced by GM methods.

198. Degnan, supra note 4.
199. Food Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938 § 403(a)(1).
200. Phil Angell, quoted in Pollan, supranote 45.
201. Lars Noah & Richard A. Merrill, Starting From Scratch? Reinventing the Food
Additive Approval Process,78 B.U. L. REv. 329,413 (1998).
202. See Pollan, supra note 45.
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3. "Economic Adulteration."
An important provision of the 1938 Act was the concept of
"economic adulteration" of food. However, since legal action based on
this principle has become next to impossible to pursue, the FDA has
practically abandoned it. The concept of economic adulteration
prohibited economic fraud upon a consumer by a manufacturer who
conceals some perceived inferior value of a product, thus misleading the
consumer into a purchase under false pretenses. This could be the case
with a consumer who buys a potato but is unaware that it produces its
own pesticide. If the consumer would have made another choice with
this information, the purchase may be considered fraudulent.
An example of this concept can be found in the use of BGH.
Whether purchasing this milk unknowingly is fraudulent is in dispute.
GM proponents assert that "no consumer who purchases milk from
cows treated with rBST has been deceived or defrauded-the milk is
precisely what it purports to be, milk.",213 When a consumer makes a
food purchase, "there is no telling whether it comes from farms owned
by godless communists, is distributed by corporations with objectionable
foreign investments... or in some other way is associated with some

political, economic, or social outcome that the consumer might find
distasteful. " 2' However, because the process has uncertain effects on
the milk produced, this argument ignores the very real differences
between BGH-treated and regular milk.
With the advent of modem technology, there are countless numbers
of substances used in food production: preservatives, emulsifiers,
stabilizers, thickeners, and a variety of other enhancements.
"Adulteration" no longer has the same meaning as it once did.
However, the FDA has pursued a number of cases that allude to the
"adulterated" concept.205
In United States v. 36 Drums of Pop 'n Oil,2 the FDA successfully

contended that a mineral oil, colored and flavored to appear as butter,
was "adulterated" because its inferiority had been concealed by making
it look like butter, although it was truthfully labeled. Although the
FDA eventually abandoned these cases, it successfully prosecuted a
number of "adulterated" products.'
Although many consumers
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Burk, supra note 19, at 291.
Id.
See HuTr & MERRILL, supra note 157, at 63-64.
164 F.2d 250 (5"' Cir. 1947).
See, e.g., United States v. 88 Cases More or Less, Containing Birely's Orange
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currently consider GM foods "inferior", there is still the problem of
representing to the consumer that these foods are marketed as being in
no way different from typical varieties. Additionally, there is substantial
evidence that many consumers desire not to purchase GM foods. The
concept of "economic adulteration" is well-suited to this particular
problem.
4. "Materially altered."
The FDCA mandates the labeling of "materially altered" foods. Of
course, there are technical problems in proving that a GM tomato is no
longer the "regular" item, although manufacturers' reference to
"traditional" tomatoes suggests that they see their new products as
separate and different. Certainly, to acquire patent protection for seeds
and fruits suggests that GM products are indeed different from their
counterparts. Consider the vigilance with which Monsanto protects its
intellectual property in seeds. The seed is "different" for patent
protection purposes but the "same" for regulatory oversight. To what
extent will food have to be genetically altered before it becomes unlike
its natural counterpart? For example, the current law would allow a
chicken bred with caterpillar genes in order to produce five wings
instead of the regular two to go undisclosed to the consumer. Should
this be considered "materially altered" if the consumer will never know
about the manipulation?
The FDA abandoned its old policy that any resemblance of a "new"
food to a traditional one, or reference to one in its name renders it
illegal. For example, enriched macaroni with fortified protein does not
violate the macaroni standard. Analogous to this is that a tomato with a
flounder gene to prevent freezing damage would not be considered as
violating a "tomato" standard.
GM proponents point out, for example, that BGH passed through to
milk is "probably neither food additives or adulterants under the
statute.., even if it were considered a food 'additive,' it has been shown
by scientific procedures to be GRAS." 2 Despite the provisions for
animal drugs like BGH, a food product such as the Bt potato may
escape any testing under the current regulatory structure. Clearly, the
FDA must be given explicit statutory authority for the testing and
labeling of GM foods. This authority will require expanded definitions
to deal with the peculiarities of biotechnology.
Beverage, 187 F.2d 967 (3d. Cir. 1951).
208. See Burk, supranote 19, at 254.
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B. Create a FederalLabeling Scheme
While calls for a federal labeling initiative have been based on
consumer choice, a more appropriate scheme would be based on
concern for public health.
Ideally, labels should facilitate
epidemiological studies to detect any increase in allergies or diseases
linked to GM foods.
As described in Part Three, states have a substantial interest in
regulating health and safety initiatives within their borders. A state-bystate GM labeling scheme has been advocated as an alternative in light
of the lack of federal guidance.3 ' Yet state regulation, while a viable
alternative, offers problems to interstate commerce and would lack the
comprehensive approach needed. Disclosures on labels would not need
to be characterized as "warning" labels. For whole foods like produce, a
display with the product name and information about the modifications
and their purpose could be devised. For components of processed
foods, the nutrition labeling guidelines already in place might describe
the "genetically modified" ingredients and indicate the percentage of
GM components used. An alternative approach might be a symbol on
the package indicating the presence of genetically engineered additives.
Not only would this disclosure provide adequate sourcing information
for consumers and businesses, it might also ease the trade problems the
U.S. currently has with exporting genetically engineered foods such as
soybeans and beef. In addition to amending the FDA guidelines, there
have been other suggestions to make the agency more efficient and risk
attentive, including contracting out the safety testing of food additives.21
C. EncourageVoluntary Labeling Efforts and Regulation on a State
Level
Independent labels serve a variety of consumer markets. By
developing guidelines targeted to their consumers, they provide more
information in the market. For this reason alone, voluntary organic
labeling is preferable to any federal pre-emption of the word
"organic." 211 There are "eco-labels," which assure that a food has been
209. For the position that mandatory labeling for GM products should be an option for
states, see Lennon, supra note 82.
210. Noah, supra note 178, at 439-41.
211. One important aspect of eco-labeling of any kind, however, is the potential impact
on trade and possible challenges as trade barriers, or international task forces like
International Standardization Organization (ISO) that seek to ensure labeling schemes can be
operated to achieve their objectives without creating unnecessary obstacles to international
trade. See generally Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety Regulation in the European Union and

1999]

FEDERAL FOOD LABELING LAW

produced in accordance with various environmental concerns. These
labels include Midwest Organic, California state certified organic,
Vermont certified organic, Mother and Others for a Livable Planet for
pesticide-free apples, "ECO-OK" coffee beans, and the Rainforest
Alliance label for Latin American produce grown only with pesticides
legal in the U.S. and Europe. The Smithsonian Migratory Bird Program
in Washington is devising a label for "bird-friendly" coffee that is both
organic and harvested in areas with a diverse mix of shade trees that
migrating songbirds from North America need to survive. Obviously,
each of these labels reaches out to a different segment of the market.
These individualized marketing niches are an effective way for
family farms and smaller companies to compete with agribusiness."'
This is because of the suitability of these methods to small-scale farming
and because of the higher prices paid for goods such as organic milk and
coffee. The natural and organic markets have only started to grow, and
these labeling initiatives need time to develop. Any confusion
presented by variety is likely to be weeded out by consumer demand.
Likewise, biotech needs time to develop its own merits, assess its risks
and benefits, and earn consumer acceptance. Unlike voluntary labeling
initiatives, however, this is a task best done through regulation rather
than market forces.
States too may establish their own voluntary labeling system. These
initiatives have a very successful history. California and Vermont have
Organic Marketing Acts; Wisconsin has provided for "BGH-free"
labels. Often, the dairies themselves will use labels, or provide them to
214
the retail outlet to display by the product, but not on the product itself.
D. Creationof a Food Safety Agency
One often-mentioned reform is creating a food-safety agency with
the United States: Different Cultures,Different Laws, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 525 (1998); Melody
Petersen, Farmers Feel Rejection of Altered Grain:Genetic Engineering Unpopular Overseas,
KANSAS CITY STAR, August 29, 1999 availablein 1999 WL 2433254.
212. Abby Scher, Green Labels: Can They Build A New Marketplace?, DOLLARS &

SENSE, May 15,1997, at 22.
213. An example of organic marketing success can be seen in Wisconsin's dairy industry.
The state lost 35% of its dairy farms between 1985 and 1995. By forming cooperative
business associations and creating organic dairy operations, many farms that would otherwise
go under are surviving. See Dr. Robert Cropp, et. al., Cooperative Ownership Comparedto
Other Business Arrangementsfor Multi-Family Dairy Operations,UCC Occasional Paper No.
11, April, 1996 availableat <http://www.wisc.edu/wcc> (visited February 15, 1999).
214. Telephone Interview with Joan Behr, Golden Guernsey Dairies/Foremost Farms
(February 15, 1998).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83.237

oversight over production processes, marketing, and labeling. This
possibility should be given more consideration as food production
becomes more complex. A new agency could pull together the
disjointed food supervisory responsibilities of the EPA, USDA, and
FDA. Unlike those agencies, a new food safety agency could avoid
conflicts by not being vested with responsibilities that compromise its
mission, like working with companies to bring products to market. This
would ease application procedures for businesses, regulate risk
assessment more carefully, and could possibly phase out GM labels
upon proof of risks and benefits.
VI. CONCLUSION

Proponents of recombinant DNA technology point out that
"biotechnology has been repeatedly identified as a 'critical' or 'generic'
industry that is important to national competitiveness., 21 s However,
because of the conflicting evidence as to the safety of GM crop
production, it is important to acknowledge risk and create a controlled
environment in which it may develop. In order to remedy the legislative
and judicial confusion that exists because of the lack of federal guidance
on GM foods, this Comment has suggested a number of statutory
definitions that might be enlarged. These revisions would allow a
federal labeling initiative that facilitates the flow of information to
consumers, in conformity with the mission of existing food labeling
legislation.
Promoting information flow in the marketplace is important to the
success of any industry.
Concealment or suppression of GM
information at this early stage in biotech development will do more to
stunt the growth of the industry than anything else, and consumers will
lose out on many of the legitimate benefits of genetic engineering as a
result. For these reasons, a federally mandated labeling scheme is
essential.
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